History and Moral Exempla in Enlightenment Aesthetics by Gárdos, Bálint
Essays in Philosophy
Volume 17
Issue 1 The Beautiful and the Good Article 3
2-12-2016
History and Moral Exempla in Enlightenment
Aesthetics
Bálint Gárdos
ELTE University, Budapest
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip
Essays in Philosophy is a biannual journal published by Pacific University Library | ISSN 1526-0569 | http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/
Recommended Citation
Gárdos, Bálint (2016) "History and Moral Exempla in Enlightenment Aesthetics," Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 17: Iss. 1, Article 3.
http://dx.doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1542
 
 
 
22 
 
History and Moral Exempla in 
Enlightenment Aesthetics 
 
Bálint Gárdos 
ELTE University, Budapest 
 
 
Abstract 
This essay proposes a new focus for studies in the relationship 
between aesthetics and morality in the Enlightenment period. 
Recent research, especially by Paul Guyer, seems to have 
established that the traditional question of whether a 
genealogy for autonomous aesthetics can be traced attending 
to the concept of disinterestedness in the era can be answered 
with an unambiguous no. This, however, should only 
encourage further research into the nature of the way in which 
the connection between the beautiful and the good was 
understood. It is argued here that with the gradual erosion of 
the humanist rhetorical understanding of history from the 
seventeenth century the specific content of the link between 
aesthetics and ethics undergoes a fundamental change, making 
it significantly more abstract and far less specific. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: 
THE DEBATE ABOUT ETHICS AND AESTHETICS IN 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENUTRY 
 
 
ooking at standard reference books, it is easy to form 
the idea that the troubled relation between the 
beautiful and the good or between aesthetics and ethics has 
been a relatively unchanging part of our culture. Matthey 
Kieran’s chapter on “Art and Morality” in the Oxford 
Handbook of Aesthetics begins by stating that “[t]he idea 
that the moral character of a work may be intimately linked 
to its artistic value can be traced back to Aristotle” (Kieran 
2015). Noël Carrol begins his chapter in the Blackwell 
Guide to Aesthetics by proposing that “[i]n all probability, 
art and morality arrived on the cultural scene at roughly the 
same moment, inasmuch as the earliest tribal moralities and 
values of the race were articulated and disseminated 
through the songs, poems, dances, narratives, and visual 
arts of our early forebears” (Carrol 2006, 126). The first 
sentence of Berys Gaut’s chapter in the Routledge 
Companion to Aesthetics claims that “[q]uestions about the 
relation of art to ethics run deep in the mainstream of the 
Western intellectual tradition” (Gaut 2013, 394). In his 
monograph on the subject Gaut is even more emphatic: 
“the relation of art to ethics has been a recurrent and central 
concern in Western culture from Plato to the present” (Gaut 
2007, 5). 
 
The sense that the relevant set of problems is historically 
continuous creates a relatively homogenous field, where 
the logically possible positions from the two spheres’ 
complete autonomy to their absolute interdependence 
have all been occupied. Sometimes it also leads to 
reluctance in taking historical change into account. In an 
L 
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up-to-date overview of the options in the debate Gaut has 
provided the following sketch.  
 
Autonomism (or aestheticism) holds that 
ethical ﬂaws or merits of works of art are 
never aesthetic ﬂaws or merits in them: 
ethical assessment is irrelevant to aesthetic 
assessment. The other two views deny this 
claim of irrelevance, but diﬀer as to how the 
ethical and aesthetic interrelate. Moralism 
(or ethicism) holds that works of art are 
always aesthetically bad in virtue of their 
ethical flaws. Contextualism (or im-
moralism) holds that works of art are 
sometimes aesthetically good in virtue of 
their ethical ﬂaws and sometimes 
aesthetically bad in virtue of them. (Gaut 
2013, 395) 
 
Probably Noël Carrol was the first, in a by now classic 
2000 article, to appreciate that the number of positions 
taken in this debate necessitates a systematic overview of 
the field. Carrol’s article is also valuable because it adds (a 
glimpse of) a historical perspective on the debate, when 
saying that, “before the modern era (before philosophers of 
art were inﬂuenced by the writings of Hutcheson and Kant), 
the notion that art can and should be criticized ethically was 
generally unexceptionable” (Carrol 2000, 351). Comment-
ing on this claim, Paul Guyer has written: “[p]resumably 
Carroll supposes that the decisive event that made this 
separation in the late eighteenth century was Kant’s 
insistence in his 1790 Critique of the Power of Judgment 
that judgments of taste are disinterested, while moral 
judgments express the interest of pure practical reason” 
(Guyer 2008, 3). The reference to “Hutcheson and Kant” 
also gestures towards one of the traditional narratives in the 
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history of aesthetics. This is a teleological narrative that 
describes eighteenth-century aesthetics as a fairly 
straightforward development from Hutcheson’s first 
attempt to write systematic aesthetics to Kant’s crowning 
achievement. All through the narrative the guiding concept 
tends to be disinterestedness: a hypothesized attitude that 
differentiates aesthetic types of experiences from all others, 
and thus also creates a gap between aesthetics and ethics 
(Szécsényi 2015). Debates surrounding this question 
routinely highlight the eighteenth century, revolving around 
questions of whether or to what extent it created a new 
language in which to discuss beauty, sublimity and a range 
of related experiences, and maybe even a new (“aesthetic”) 
way of looking at the world.  
 
This question formed the subject matter of the much 
commented-on interchange between Jerome Stolnitz and 
George Dickie. In his 1961 article “On the Origins of 
‘Aesthetic Disinterestedness’” Stolnitz looks at standard 
early eighteenth century British authors claiming that the 
concept of disinterestedness is found with such a coherent 
insistence in their work that it suffices as a proof that a new 
discipline in gradually coming into existence. At the 
beginning, he states that “[t]he present paper is concerned 
with aesthetic theory solely”, and when later on he is 
forced, for instance in the case of Shaftesbury, to treat of 
ethics as well, the explanation is “that Shaftesbury’s ethical 
theory thus turns out to be very nearly indistinguishable 
from an aesthetic theory” (Stolnitz 1961, 131, 133). This 
seems to indicate that, whether or not Stolnitz is right about 
his analysis (and following Dickie a number of interpreters 
have pointed out its mistakes), his argument cannot be used 
to substantiate a split between aesthetics and ethics 
occurring in the eighteenth century. More importantly, 
however, one is entitled to doubt how far either contestant’s 
point of view is properly historical. Concerning the issue of 
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“historical priorities” Stolnitz was quite explicit that “I 
share Dickie’s view that it is less important than 
distinguishing the theory models we are to use in the 
analysis and classification of the writings of this period” 
(Stolnitz 1978, 409). Stolnitz’s own theory demands that 
aesthetics be seen as something autonomous and rooted in a 
distinctive subjective “attitude” so he looks for precursors 
to this thought in the eighteenth century, while Dickie’s 
“institutional analysis” requires that this hypothetical 
autonomy be done away with and so he turns to eighteenth-
century theories of taste to provide a genealogy for just 
that. As Carrol has convincingly argued:  
 
[t]hat Dickie’s rejection of the various 
notions of aesthetic faculties/attitudes/ 
experiences comes prior to his proposals 
concerning the theory of art can be seen as 
part of an argumentative ground-clearing 
operation, one devoted to dismissing 
aesthetic theories of art as viable contenders 
in the realm of art theory by calling into 
question the acceptability of any 
characterization of the correlative state in 
spectators that artworks putatively engender. 
(Carrol 2001, 22) 
 
 So strong is the connection between present-day concerns 
and supposed historical reconstructions that Miles Rind’s 
worries are very easy to share. “The decline of the theory of 
the aesthetic attitude […] should not be allowed to take the 
eighteenth-century writers with it: they are worth 
recovering from Stolnitz’s own recovery attempt.” (Rind 
2002, 69) 
 
Paul Guyer has presented a very powerful argument about 
the impossibility of disentangling aesthetics and ethics in 
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eighteenth-century thought along lines defined by the 
concept of disinterestedness. He proves that “neither Kant 
himself nor those of his predecessors who ﬁrst introduced 
the idea of the disinterestedness of judgments of beauty, 
namely Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of 
Shaftesbury, and Francis Hutcheson, thought that the 
disinterestedness of judgments of taste in general 
precluded the centrality of ethical issues to works of art in 
particular, and thus the appropriateness of ethical criticism 
of such works” (Guyer 2008, 4). Guyer demonstrates that 
in all above-mentioned theoreticians (and in many others) 
disinterestedness actually enables the ethical criticism of 
works of art. I will mention just a few of his examples. 
From Baumgarten, he quotes that “nothing can be 
beautiful that is not moral” (Guyer 2008, 6). In Diderot 
also he demonstrates a strong connection between art and 
ethics. “To make virtue attractive, vice odious, and 
ridicule effective: such is the project every upstanding 
man who takes up the pen, the brush, or the chisel should 
make his own” (Guyer 2008, 9). In Lord Kames, art is a 
means of sympathy: the better the art the stronger the 
moral impact. “Thus, not only history but also novels and 
plays are ‘the most universal and favourite 
entertainments’, because in them we ‘enter deep into the 
concerns’ and ‘partake of [the] joys and distresses’ of 
other human beings” (Guyer 2008, 10). Moving on to the 
theory of disinterestedness, he states that “Shaftesbury’s 
separation of the contemplation of beauty from the 
fulﬁllment of desire and of true virtue from mercenary and 
self-regarding interest was meant precisely to open the 
way for the recognition that at bottom beauty and moral 
goodness are closely connected, thus ‘That Beauty and 
Good are still the same’” (Guyer 2008, 13). When it 
comes to Hutcheson, Guyer also demonstrates his 
unquestioning assumption that the point of a work of art is 
to engage our passions of “Honour and Virtue,” […] there 
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is no suggestion in Hutcheson’s account of the sense of 
beauty that ethical criticism is distinct from aesthetic 
criticism, or the criticism of a work of art as a work of art” 
(Guyer 2008, 16). Ultimately “[f]or Kant, our response to 
ﬁne art as such is much more complicated than the simple 
case of pure aesthetic response and judgment with which 
he begins for expository purposes, and centrally involves 
a moral aspect.” (Guyer 2008, 18) In short, we can say 
that the answer to the question in Guyer’s title—“Is 
Ethical Criticism a Problem?”—is a clear no: not in the 
eighteenth century.  
 
In this essay, I would like to argue that even if we accept 
Guyer’s argument that the developing notion of 
disinterestedness does not lead to a separation between 
aesthetics and ethics in the eighteenth century, we should 
still be careful not to let the problem disappear from sight 
altogether. I believe that ethical criticism is a problem in 
the eighteenth century (and even before that in the 
Enlightenment) not simply because of the rise of 
aesthetics, but because of the increasingly complex and 
troubling awareness of history as a factor in the critical 
act. It is the complications about the historical point of 
view in criticism that make ethical criticism a problem.  
 
To appreciate the change in the understanding of history 
we have to begin our narrative earlier than what we are 
accustomed to and to look at texts other than the standard 
philosophical treatises we call (sometimes anachron-
istically) aesthetic. I propose that an examination of the 
critical practice in the decades leading up to Shaftesbury 
and Hutcheson reveals the confusions surrounding the 
meaning of history and also the reasons why this makes 
ethical criticism more problematic than it had been earlier.  
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2. ETHICAL CRITICISM IN THE LATE 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
 
The late seventeenth century displays the parallel existence 
of two markedly different understandings of history: a 
newer and an older one. Humanist tradition, which is the 
older one, is characterized by using history as the 
storehouse of exempla in the service of rhetoric (Nadel 
1964). Anthony Grafton’s summary is apt.  
 
The formal study of history, according to 
this tradition, was a matter of production 
rather than consumption: of defining the 
devices which enabled the historian to 
instruct, and at the same time to touch, the 
reader. Good history narrated past events, in 
an accurate, prudent, and eloquent way. 
Readers studied it in the hope of 
understanding the political calculations of 
ancient leaders, as expressed in speeches, 
and of sharpening their grasp of moral 
precepts and their applications, as embodied 
in crisp, specific historical examples. 
(Grafton 2007, 11) 
 
A classic example in the English language comes from 
Francis Bacon’s The Advancement of Learning (1605). 
“[T]he form of writing which of all others is fittest [is] 
discourse upon histories or examples. For knowledge 
drawn freshly and in our view out of particulars, knoweth 
the way best to particulars again” (Bacon 1996, 270–271). 
The moral hermeneutic that Bacon sketches here (the 
cultured reader’s ability to recognize a general principle in 
a given human act and then to apply it again specifically in 
his or her own life) means that history has a clear practical 
value, it serves the present with guidance in a range of 
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matters mostly regarding the right behavior in public life. 
History in this context is typically seen as more powerful 
than philosophy because we are moved by the individual 
examples of the first in a way that we are not by the general 
theories of the second. Poetry (literature) here is strongly 
connected to history: it gives specific, sensuous examples 
of the right (or wrong) form of behavior in given situations. 
This theory, thus, made a clear break with the tradition 
established by Aristotle’s Poetics that associates poetry 
with philosophy and contrasts it with history because of its 
ability to dwell on the potential and not just record the 
actual. According to the early modern tradition glimpsed 
here it is rather poetry’s perceived ability to mediate 
between the vivid specificity of an instance of behavior and 
a general moral rule, which then the readers can again 
apply to their individual circumstances that makes it 
uniquely significant (Youngren 1968). The most eloquent 
argument for the nobility of poetry along these lines 
belongs to Sir Philip Sidney, who in his An Apology for 
Poetry (printed in 1595) compares poetry to both history 
and philosophy, saying that it offers the best of both: the 
specificity of history is here combined with the principled 
nature of moral philosophy. 
 
The philosopher therefore and the historian 
are they which would win the goal, the one 
by precept, the other by example; but both 
not having both, do both halt. For the 
philosopher, setting down with thorny 
arguments the bare rule, is so hard of 
utterance and so misty to be conceived, that 
one that hath no other guide but him shall 
wade in him till he be old, before he shall 
find sufficient cause to be honest. For his 
knowledge standeth so upon the abstract and 
general that happy is that man who may 
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understand him, and more happy that can 
apply what he doth understand. On the other 
side, the historian, wanting the precept, is so 
tied, not to what should be but to what is, to 
the particular truth of things, and not to the 
general reason of things, that his example 
draweth no necessary consequence, and 
therefore a less fruitful doctrine. 
 
Now doth the peerless poet perform both; for 
whatsoever the philosopher saith should be 
done, he giveth a perfect picture of it in some 
one by whom he presupposeth it was done, so 
as he coupleth the general notion with the 
particular example. A perfect picture, I say; 
for he yieldeth to the powers of the mind an 
image of that whereof the philosopher 
bestoweth but a wordish description, which 
doth neither strike, pierce, nor possess the 
sight of the soul so much as that other doth. 
(Sidney 1965, 106–7) 
 
Creating a “perfect picture” in which “general notion” is 
tied to “particular example”—there could be no more 
succinct summary of this tradition. Timothy Hampton has 
demonstrated how “the texts of the Renaissance stress the 
importance of their relationship to their readers. They seek 
to provide the reader with a variety of options for possible 
action in the world. They educate the faculty of judgement 
and seek to influence behavior within a specific social 
sphere. They aim to move readers to various types of moral 
and political behavior. And the representation of exemplary 
figures from history is a principal rhetorical technique in 
this process of shaping the reader.” (Hampton 1990, 4) 
While the exempla used tended to be taken from antiquity, 
what mattered was not the dialogue between two specific 
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moments in history (the exemplum’s point of origin and the 
moment of its application) but the educated ability to move 
between certain images (or narratives) and the general 
“precepts” of philosophy (Trousdale 1973; Wallace 1974). 
According to Reinhart Koselleck, the famous “historia 
magistra vitae” formula  
 
implies a thorough apprehension of human 
possibilities within a general historical 
continuum. History can instruct its 
contemporaries or descendants on how to 
become more prudent or relatively better, 
but only as long as the given assumptions 
and conditions are fundamentally the same. 
Until the eighteenth century, the use of our 
expression remained an unmistakable index 
for an assumed constancy of human nature, 
accounts of which serve as iterable means 
for the proof of moral, theological, legal, or 
political doctrines. […] The temporal 
structure of past history bounded a 
continuous space of potential experience. 
(Koselleck 2004, 27–8) 
 
What I will argue is that it is the sense of continuity and the 
sense of iterability that has become strained by the time 
classical aesthetics begins to get written. History will no 
longer be a collection of rhetorical commonplaces, proving 
that the best patterns of behavior and the most valuable 
virtues are the same, irrespective of time, place or culture. 
The reasons are probably manifold, but two of them, at 
least, seem to have a bearing on the present subject. The 
first is a significant growth in “history method literature” 
which shows a certain professionalization of history. This 
means that history’s automatic subordination to rhetoric 
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(and through rhetoric to ethics and politics) is increasingly 
problematic (Witschi-Bernz 1972). In Grafton’s words  
 
[t]he ars historica […] formed part of a 
much larger effort to master and use the 
floods of information pouring into Europe 
from travelers, navigators, and missionaries 
[…] The most prominent and original 
writers in the field […] all insisted that the 
critical reader of history must embrace the 
known world in all its immense variety. 
Doing so, however, put unbearable strain on 
traditional theories of history. (Grafton 
2007, 198) 
 
Also central to our purpose is the celebrated quarrel 
between the ancients and the moderns which in Britain 
culminates around the turn of the eighteenth century. The 
ancients were concerned with preserving the unquestioned 
(indeed, practically unexamined) authority of a rather 
limited canon of texts from classical antiquity, and the 
possibility of those texts’ mobilization as the unsurpassed 
sources of the best forms of behavior against what they 
perceived as the onslaught of irreverent and (for them) 
irrelevant questions coming from the moderns. Questions 
like does it matter if we cannot be sure who the author is? 
Do we know when exactly this or that text was written? 
Do we understand the exact meaning of a word at a 
specific moment in time (in a given dialect, etc.)? What do 
we make of competing textual traditions? Such questions 
had a lot to do with history, but not with history conceived 
as a majestic continuum, rather as something that leads the 
researcher on to ever more subtle distinctions, to an ever 
more complex understanding that while certain values 
might be eternal, human behavior is at least influenced by 
the times we live in. Much of what passed as heroism in 
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the days of Homer would seem barbaric in enlightened 
Europe (Levine, Pask).  
 
What is most striking, however, is the parallel presence of 
the two concepts of history in many works, whereby, for 
instance, certain phenomena can be explained (or explained 
away) through claims to the effect that “those were 
different times”, while the timeless quality of central 
human values is still upheld. John Dryden (who was not 
only a poet, a critic and a translator, but also had the title of 
historiographer royal), presents excellent examples both of 
the modern relativist spirit and of its opposite. In his Of 
Dramatic Poetry: An Essay (1668) he treats English and 
French drama as two distinct traditions, and subordinates 
neither to ancient drama, because he believes that drama is 
necessarily dependent on local customs and the 
expectations of the audience. The strongest-worded 
statement of his historical position can be found in a never-
elaborated and only posthumously published sketch written 
in 1677 and usually referred to as “Heads of an Answer to 
Rymer”. Thomas Rymer’s The Tragedies of the Last Age 
(published in 1678) contained a harsh indictment of English 
drama based on its violation of the eternal rules that can be 
derived from ancient practice. The same set of rules applies 
in present-day London as in ancient Athens because 
“Nature is the same, and Man is the same; he loves, 
grieves, hates, envies, has the same affections and passions 
in both places” (Zimansky 1971, 19). Dryden disagrees:  
 
tho’ nature, as he [Rymer] objects, is the 
same in all places, and reason too the same, 
yet the climate, the age, the dispositions of 
the people to whom a poet writes, may be so 
different that what pleased the Greeks would 
not satisfy an English audience. (Dryden 
1962, 1, 214)  
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Two things are noteworthy here. The first is that a certain 
understanding of “period” is beginning to emerge in these 
lines. This is the argument that John Dennis will elaborate 
in his anti-Rymer The Impartial Critic (1693). He argues 
that disregarding historical period is not permissible, 
because “to set up the Grecian Method amongst us with 
success, it is absolutely necessary to restore not only their 
Religion and their Polity, but to transport us to the same 
Climate in which Sophocles and Euripides writ” (Hooker 1, 
11). The second important point, however, is that Dryden is 
not a thoroughgoing relativist and does not want to let go of 
the humanist assumption that human nature is ultimately 
the same, irrespective of period or culture, which ensures 
that works of art can have influence over time. Probably his 
most elaborate discussion of history along these lines is to 
be found in his 1683 “The Life of Plutarch”. Here he claims 
to have always read history for pleasure and entertainment.  
 
But they who have employed the study of it 
as they ought, for their instruction, for the 
regulation of their private manners, and the 
management of public affairs, must agree 
with me that it is the most pleasant school of 
wisdom. […] It informs the understanding 
by the memory. It helps us to judge of what 
will happen, by shewing us the like 
revolutions of former times. For mankind 
being the same in all ages, agitated by the 
same passions, and moved to action by the 
same interests, nothing can come to pass but 
some precedent of the like nature has 
already been produced, so that having the 
same causes before our eyes, we cannot 
easily be deceived in the effects if we have 
judgment enough but to draw the parallel. 
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God, ‘tis true, with his divine providence, 
overrules and guides all actions to the secret 
end he has ordained them; but in the way of 
human causes, a wise man may easily 
discern that there is a natural cause betwixt 
them; and tho’ he cannot foresee accidents, 
or all things that possibly can come, he may 
apply examples, and by them foretell that 
from the like counsels will probably succeed 
the like events; and thereby, in all 
concernments, and all offices of life, be 
instructed in the two main points on which 
depend our happiness, that is, what to avoid 
and what to choose. (Dryden 1962, 2, 4)  
 
This passage contains all the traditional ingredients. It 
creates the expected link between history and poetry since 
both can profitably be read for pleasure and for instruction. 
It relies on an explicitly stated hypothesis about the 
fundamental sameness of human nature. Crucially, it 
sketches a model, assumed to be universally accepted, in 
which history functions as a storehouse of examples, kept 
in the memory and applied to any given situation by the 
judgement. As long as this framework of understanding is 
intact, it makes the connection between the enjoyment of 
reading and its moral usefulness direct, conceptually clear, 
and easy to translate into critical practice whenever a 
specific work is under consideration.  
 
We have already seen, however, that in the criticism of this 
period history was increasingly construed less as a site of 
sameness and generality (an awe-inspiring pattern of the 
same forms of behavior against the backdrop of the 
perceived sameness of human nature) and more as one of 
difference and specificity (specific forms of human 
behavior that can only be judged in the context of the 
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norms of a given period). The result is, I believe, a certain 
ambiguity. The connection between aesthetics and ethics 
never disappears altogether but it does become more 
difficult to give it specific substance.  
 
The ambiguity is visible, even if we disregard art for a 
moment. Dryden seems to believe in the ever greater 
refinement of human interaction. In 1672, he argues that 
one advantage contemporary writers have over those of the 
Renaissance is a result of a different type of culture: “the 
wit of this age is much more courtly”, this “greatest 
advantage of our writing […] proceeds from conversation. 
In the age wherein those poets lived, there was less of 
gallantry than in ours; neither did they keep the best 
company of theirs. […] I cannot find that any of them were 
conversant in the courts, except Ben Jonson” (Dryden 
1962, 1, 180–1). Especially when it comes to refinement of 
language use and versification, Dryden likes to talk about 
gradual improvement. Concerning Chaucer, for instance, he 
says that, “he lived in the infancy of our poetry, and that 
nothing is brought to perfection at the first. We must be 
children before we grow men. There was an Ennius, and in 
the process of time a Lucilius, and a Lucretius, before 
Virgil and Horace; even after Chaucer there was a Spenser, 
a Harington, a Fairfax, before Waller and Denham were in 
being; and our numbers were in their nonage till these last 
appeared.” (Dryden 1962, 2, 281) Clearly, none of these 
scattered remarks (and many more could be quoted) 
amount to a philosophy of history, but they indicate a 
manifest interest in matters of context-dependent change in 
human affairs.  
 
In the field specifically of literary criticism and theory the 
offshoot of this hesitancy to unequivocally embrace either 
change or stability is a two-layered model of literary works, 
where linguistic and artistic form together with specific 
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cultural norms are only the surface (that can be further 
polished in later ages). In revising Troilus and Cressida, 
Dryden says,  
 
because the play was Shakespeare’s, and 
that there appeared in some places of it the 
admirable genius of the author, I undertook 
to remove that heap of rubbish under which 
many excellent thoughts lay wholly buried. 
Accordingly, I new modelled the plot; threw 
out many unnecessary persons; improved 
those characters that were begun and left 
unfinished. […] I need not say that I have 
refined the language, which before was 
obsolete… (Dryden 1962, 1, 240–1)  
 
While many have been shocked by the extent to which 
restoration writers interfered with Shakespearean texts, 
what we should notice is that this boldness is capacitated by 
an equally strong belief that something essential will 
remain the same. “[M]oral truth is the mistress of the poet 
as much as the philosopher: poesy must resemble natural 
truth, but it must be ethical. Indeed the poet dresses truth, 
and adorns nature, but does not alter them […] though the 
fancy may be great and the words flowing, yet the soul is 
but half satisfied when there is not truth in the foundation.” 
(Dryden 1962, 1, 121) In other words, ahistorical morality 
is still at the heart of the response to the work of art. 
However, the (much abbreviated) list of what needs to be 
changed for the moral lesson to shine through in Dryden’s 
present also shows that the iterability of ancient examples 
has come to be far more problematic than it used to be. 
Despite the increased awareness of period and culture 
specific factors in human behavior the insistence that art is 
moral has remained unchanged, but what exactly its 
morality consists in has become harder to pin down. 
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A similar ambiguity can be observed in John Dennis, 
whose argument for taking historical context into account 
has already been quoted. He is no less averse than Dryden 
to uniting attention to period with emphasis on eternal 
truths in art. In his 1701 The Advancement and Reformation 
of Poetry, for instance, aesthetic effect is dependent on a 
transhistorical order.  
 
There is nothing in Nature that is great and 
beautiful, without Rule and Order; and the 
more Rule and Order, and Harmony, which 
we find we find in the Objects that strike our 
Senses, the more Worthy and Noble we 
esteem them. I humbly conceive, that it is 
the same in Art, and particularly in Poetry, 
which ought to be an exact imitation of 
Nature. Now Nature, taken in a stricter 
Sense, is nothing but that Rule and Order, 
and Harmony, which we find in the visible 
Creation. The Universe owes its admirable 
beauty to the Proportion, Situation and 
Dependence of its parts. And the little 
World, which we call Man, owes not only its 
Health and Ease and Pleasure, nay, the 
continuance of its very Being to the 
Regularity of Mechanical motion, but even 
the strength too of its boasted Reason, and 
the piercing force of those aspiring thoughts, 
which are able to pass the bounds that 
circumscribe the Universe. As Nature is 
Order and Rule and Harmony in the visible 
World, so Reason is the very same 
throughout the invisible Creation. For 
Reason is Order and the Result of Order. 
And nothing that is Irregular, as far as it is 
Irregular, ever was or ever can be either 
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Natural or Reasonable. Whatever God 
Created he designed it Regular… (Hooker 
1939, 1, 202) 
 
What Dennis’s metaphysics of beauty and sublimity 
highlights is the simultaneous development around the turn 
of the eighteenth century of an increasingly thorough 
recognition of period and culture dependent factors 
regarding art (especially the drama where changing 
audience expectations clearly had to be taken into account) 
and an increasingly abstract, philosophical discourse 
regarding the religious, moral, social aspects of our 
experience of beauty. Both types of discourse have very far 
reaching roots but what I take to be distinctive of the period 
is their parallel presence, often in the same piece of writing, 
because it indicates a strained relationship between the 
eternal and the temporal aspects of art, an anxiety 
concerning the iterability of the moral patterns that it was 
assumed to convey. 
 
3. ETHICAL CRITICISM IN EARLY EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY AESTHETICS 
 
Lord Shaftesbury’s “A Notion of the Historical Draught or 
Tablature of the Judgment of Hercules” seems to present a 
textbook example of an old-fashioned understanding of art 
which is morally exemplary. That essay is a very detailed 
description of how a classical topos from antiquity, 
displaying its hero in the moment of choosing virtue over 
pleasure, is best depicted. One problem here is that, 
obviously, the resulting (or imaginary) artwork will present 
moral choice as abstract to the level of being completely 
empty in terms of specific content. What Shaftesbury 
focuses on is a visual language that best displays the 
rhetorical clash between the two allegorical women and the 
inner agon of the hero, the moment his moral character 
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finally takes shape (Leatherbarrow). “By the word Moral is 
understood, in this place, all sort of judiciouse 
Representations of the human Passions.” (Cooper 1981, I.5, 
118) The passions a work of visual art is taken to represent 
are universal, but art itself is seen as very much influenced 
by the cultural politics of the times.  
 
[W]ithout a publick Voice, knowingly 
guided and directed, there is nothing which 
can raise a true Ambition in the Artist; 
nothing which can exalt the Genius of the 
workman, or make him emulouse of after-
Fame, and of the approbation of his 
Country, and of Posterity. For with these he 
naturally, as a Freeman, must take part: in 
these he has a passionate Concern, and 
Interest, rais’d in him by the same Genius of 
Liberty, the same Laws and Government by 
which his Property and the Rewards of his 
Pains and Industry are secur’d to him, and to 
his Generation after him.  
 
Every thing co-operates, in such a State, 
towards the improvement of Art and 
Science. […] When the free Spirit of a 
Nation turns it-self this way; Judgments are 
form’d; Criticks arise; the publick Eye and 
Ear improves; a right Taste prevails, and in a 
manner forces its way. Nothing is so 
improving, nothing so natural, so con-genial 
to the liberal Arts, as that reigning Liberty 
and high Spirit of a People, which from the 
Habit of judging in the highest Matters for 
themselves, makes ’em freely judge of other 
Subjects, and enter thoroughly into the 
Characters as well of Men and Manners, as 
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of the Products or Works of Men, in Art and 
Science. So much, My Lord, are we owing 
to the Excellence of our national 
Constitution, and legal Monarchy… (Cooper 
1981, I.5, 50)  
 
A great virtue of a painting is its “natural Simplicity and 
Grace” (Cooper 1981, I.5, 120), which reminds the 
reader that in the earlier and far more elaborate pieces of 
the Characteristics Shaftesbury, much like Dennis, 
regards nature as a harmonious, divine order that works 
of art should imitate and extend. In “Sensus Communis”, 
for example, he says the following about nature, art and 
morality. “Let Poets, or the Men of Harmony, deny, if 
they can, this Force of Nature, or withstand this moral 
Magick. They, for their parts, carry a double portion of 
this Charm about with ’em. For in the first place, the 
very Passion which inspires ’em, is it-self the Love of 
Numbers, Decency and Proportion; and this too, not in a 
narrow sense or after a selfish way (for Who is there that 
composes for himself?), but in a friendly social View; for 
the Pleasure and Good of others; even down to Posterity, 
and future Ages.” (Cooper 1981, I.3, 112) Thus, it seems 
that for Shaftesbury both the form and the moral (and 
social, political) power of a work come from its 
continuity with harmonious nature. Obviously, then, the 
beautiful and the good are very strongly connected here, 
but morality no longer comes from the vivid 
representation of specific forms of morally meaningful 
action (as in the traditional understanding of history) but 
from a very abstract philosophical understanding and 
aesthetic enjoyment of order in created nature. Historical 
change is very important for Shaftesbury in talking about 
art in general, but not when we turn specifically to its 
moral meaning. 
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Francis Hutcheson’s An Inquiry into the Original of Our 
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises (1725) is a 
very good example of the type of difficulty I discuss. The 
fact that the two treatises it is made up of (“An Inquiry 
Concerning Beauty, Order, &c.” and “An Inquiry 
Concerning the Original of our Ideas Concerning Virtue or 
Moral Good”) separate the discussion of the beautiful and 
the good in a marked way should not be taken as a proof of 
a complete isolation of aesthetics. Indeed, Hutcheson opens 
up many avenues to connecting our experience of beauty or 
order to moral qualities. However, the fact that most of the 
discussion of art and especially poetry can be found in the 
second treatise (the one about morality) suggests that it is 
not the formal discussion of beauty where we should seek 
for insights into art, especially the moral element in art. 
What I think we see in this early work is the parallel 
presence of an emphatically modern discussion, rooted in 
Lockean epistemology, of the ideas of beauty and a very 
traditional discussion of the moral impact of poetry and the 
arts (embedded in an again very innovative proto-utilitarian 
argument). Hutcheson professes a strong belief in the 
power of “Statues and Panegyricks” to “accomplish” acts 
of disinterested goodness (Hutcheson 2004, 98). Moreover, 
he repeatedly uses conventional examples of preferable 
behavior from classical poetry and mythology. “Why do 
not we love Sinon, Pyrrhus, in the Aeneid? for had we been 
Greeks, these two would have been very advantageous 
Characters. Why are we affected with the Fortunes of 
Priamus, Polites, Choroebus or Aeneas? It is plain we have 
some secret Sense which determines our Approbation 
without regard to Self-Interest; otherwise we should always 
favour the fortunate Side without regard to Virtue.” 
(Hutcheson 2004, 92) When it comes to poetry, Hutcheson 
is content to reiterate the old conviction that its moral value 
is due to the ability to present lively images of human 
behavior that helps us make the right choices in our lives.  
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Where we are studying to raise any Desire, 
or Admiration of an Object really beautiful, 
we are not content with a bare Narration, but 
endeavour, if we can, to present the Object it 
self, or the most lively Image of it. And 
hence the Epic Poem, or Tragedy, gives a 
vastly greater Pleasure than the Writings of 
Philosophers, tho both aim at recommending 
Virtue. The representing the Actions 
themselves, if the Representation be 
judicious, natural, and lively, will make us 
admire the Good, and detest the Vitious, the 
Inhuman, the Treacherous and Cruel, by 
means of our moral Sense, without any 
Reflections of the Poet to guide our 
Sentiments. (Hutcheson 2004, 173)  
 
But the point is that this old-fashioned humanist conviction 
is very difficult to connect to the first part of the Inquiry, 
the one that was to have a lasting influence on aesthetics.  
 
Lord Kames’s Elements of Criticism (1762) discusses 
aesthetics in the context of the morally significant subject 
of sympathy. “The principles of the fine arts, appear in this 
view to open a direct avenue to the heart of man. The 
inquisitive mind beginning with criticism, the most 
agreeable of all amusements, and finding no obstruction in 
its progress, advances far into the sensitive part of our 
nature; and gains imperceptibly a thorough knowledge of 
the human heart, of its desires, and of every motive to 
action; a science, which of all that can be reached by man, 
is to him of the greatest importance” (Home 2005, 1, 32). 
Through the description of the way they affect the passions, 
Kames has important claims to make about the moral 
significance of art but the discussion takes place on a plane 
far too general to leave space for a detailed investigation of 
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moral exempla. Lord Kames bases his strong belief on a 
“sense or conviction of a common nature” (Home 2005, 2, 
720). Here the parallel between moral and aesthetic 
universalism is most pronounced. “This conviction of a 
common nature or standard and of its perfection, accounts 
clearly for that remarkable conception we have, of a right 
and a wrong sense or taste in morals. It accounts not less 
clearly for the conception we have of a right and a wrong 
sense or taste in the fine arts” (Home 2005, 2, 722.) “The 
sympathetic emotion of virtue” is the most important moral 
passion that art is allowed to incite. This, however, Lord 
Kames places firmly outside culture and characterizes as 
one of the rather primitive components of human nature. 
“This singular feeling, which may be termed the 
sympathetic emotion of virtue, resembles, in one respect, 
the well-known appetites that lead to the propagation and 
preservation of the species” (Home 2005, 1, 50.) Clearly, 
this leaves very little room for consideration of history—in 
any possible sense of the word.  
 
Hugh Blair’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres 
(1783) makes a similar point about the usefulness of 
inquires (parts of which) today we would style aesthetic for 
“the philosophy of human nature”.  
 
To apply the principles of good sense to 
composition and discourse; to examine what 
is beautiful, and why it is so; to employ 
ourselves in distinguishing accurately 
between the specious and the solid, between 
affected and natural ornament, must 
certainly improve us not a little in the most 
valuable part of all philosophy, the 
philosophy of human nature. For such 
disquisitions are very intimately connected 
with the knowledge of ourselves. They 
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necessarily lead us to reflect on the 
operations of the imagination, and the 
movements of the heart; and increase our 
acquaintance with some of the most refined 
feelings which belong to our frame. (Blair 
2005, 7)  
 
One might even say that, despite the many differences, in 
this regard British and German discourse progresses in a 
similar direction: from practical tracts on how to create and 
appreciate beauty in a way which includes morality to 
increasingly speculative works which treat aesthetic 
experience as source material for the philosophical analysis 
of the workings of the human mind. In Kai Hammer-
maister’s succinct summary, “[t]he aesthetics of 
Baumgarten and Mendelssohn can be considered an 
undertaking to claim epistemological relevance for sensual 
perception” (Hammermaister 2002, 4). 
 
Immanuel Kant is obviously the most discussed 
philosopher in the Enlightenment tradition of aesthetics. 
Even to try to list the debated areas in this part of his work 
would be far beyond the limits of a paper like this one. 
There are widely differing interpretations and appraisals, 
for instance, of the way in which he tries to present 
aesthetics as an autonomous discipline but as one that still 
creates the vital links between theory and practice or nature 
and morality or the sensible and the supersensible, 
respectively the subjects of his two first Critiques.  
 
One specific problem area derives from the fact that 
according to §6 of Kant’s Critique of the Power of 
Judgment “there is no transition from concepts to the 
feeling of pleasure or displeasure”, which is to say no “pure 
judgment of taste” has any connection to recognition (Kant 
2000, 97). One does not experience beauty as an instance of 
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anything. About this, even Ted Cohen’s and Dabney 
Townsend’s otherwise markedly different readings seem to 
converge. Cohen claims that “in an experience of beauty, 
one is attending to the absolute and complete particularity 
of the beautiful object. Beautiful things, of nature and of 
art, are thus unique.” (Cohen 2002, 3) Townsend argues 
that “‘Beauty’ as a taste predicate cannot be generalized” 
(Townsend 2003, 78). Although the context is very 
different, one can see this as the logical endpoint of the 
erosion of the humanist belief in the moral function of art. 
That, we remember, depended on recognition: on 
recognizing in artistic representation an example of morally 
significant behavior. Kant’s aesthetics, however, quite 
specifically disables such connections. This does not mean 
that he never tries to forge new connections between the 
beautiful and the good, but it will no longer be based on the 
recognition of a specific morally significant act that one 
could then iterate. 
 
Again, Kant’s system makes it impossible to interpret 
works of art as vivid pictures of moral behavior that 
connect specific situations to abstract dilemmas, since by 
definition the realm of the moral is the realm of the 
supersensible, the concepts of reason are indemonstrable 
(cf. Zuidervaart 2003). Nor do we fare much better if we 
want to reconnect to the old humanist convictions if we 
look at Kant’s striking formulation of “aesthetic ideas”. In 
Henry E Allison’s interpretation, the essential thing about 
the relationship between aesthetic and moral ideas is that it 
is merely based on a formal similarity, and is not realised in 
any particular work of art: “it is in virtue of the same 
formal feature through which aesthetic ideas symbolize 
ideas of reason that they also symbolize morality, whether 
or not the particular ideas they evoke are directly related to 
morality (Allison 2001, 260–1).  
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4. SOME CONCLUSIONS 
 
What this article has argued is that while we can agree that 
it is misleading to talk about the rise of aesthetics as a 
process of emancipation from moral philosophy we should 
still talk about the nature of the connection between the 
beautiful and the good, because that does seem to undergo 
remarkable change during the Enlightenment period. From 
a model which is based on the repetition and application of 
a closed number of specific cases that a work of art is 
supposed to powerfully represent we move to a far more 
abstract model whereby the connection between the 
beautiful and the good is still hypothesized but the 
humanistic belief in the power of moral exempla is 
gradually replaced by broader philosophical principles. 
Probably there are many factors that contribute to this 
process. The one I have tried to highlight was the 
transformation of the understanding of history which at the 
start of the process can be seen as an inventory of exempla 
in the service of rhetoric, but which with an increased 
awareness of history as a site of change can no longer be 
seen as merely such. As the hold of the exempla gradually 
erodes it is the principle of iterability as the substance of 
the moral value of art that comes to be threatened leaving 
the question open whether aesthetics can eventually do 
more than wishfully gesture towards morality.  
 
Additionally to the strict historical scope of this paper I 
would suggest that the above line of thought holds two 
more valuable lessons for contemporary discussions of the 
relationship between aesthetics and ethics. The first is that 
we should probably be somewhat more wary in applying 
the Aristotelian model to the moral import of art. In what 
has been one of the most influential treatments of the 
subject Martha C. Nussbaum categorically states that it is 
the Aristotelian conception of art’s ability to dwell with the 
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potential that releases its moral potency to help us, through 
the sympathetic imagination, to place ourselves into other 
people’s (fictitious) words, which might be radically 
different from our own.  
 
Aristotle is correct. Unlike most historical 
works, literary works typically invite their 
readers to put themselves in the place of 
people of many different kinds and to take 
on their experiences. In their very mode of 
address to their imagined reader, they 
convey the sense that there are links of 
possibility, at least on a very general level, 
between the characters and the reader. 
(Nussbaum 1995, 5)  
 
We do well, however, to remember that while the moral 
understanding of art tends to require that we be able to 
place ourselves in other people’s shoes, historical record 
tends to show that the point about this ability has more 
often than not been to recognize sameness and not to 
overcome difference. The typical example did not use to be 
Nussbaum’s Harvard student sympathetically identifying 
with the urban poor in a Dickens novel, but a statesman 
from the social elite of a given society recognizing the 
types of dilemmas he (almost invariably he) faces in the 
actions of another statesman from the social elite of a given 
society with which he feels his own to be largely 
continuous. The radical questions in a democratic 
understanding of the moral power of art only begin to 
emerge when we face the difficulty of transforming that 
model and seeing whether it survives in the face of real 
difference in culture, gender, religion, etc. 
 
The second lesson worth emphasizing is simply the 
importance of history to any such discussion. Contemp-
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orary aesthetics should not disregard either its own history 
or indeed history as such as a factor in both moral and 
aesthetic judgments. Nor should it forget that history itself 
is a concept that tends to change with history.  
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